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Shiller (2003) and others have argued for the creation of financial instruments that allow individuals
to insure risks associated with their lifetime labor income. In this paper, we argue that while the purpose
of such assets is to smooth consumption across states of nature, one must also consider the assets' effects
on households' ability to smooth consumption over time. We show that consumers in a realistically
calibrated life-cycle model would generally prefer income-linked loans (with a rate positively correlated
with income shocks) to an income-hedging instrument (a limited liability asset whose returns correlate
negatively with income shocks) even though the assets offer identical opportunities to smooth consumption
across states. While for some parameterizations of our model the welfare gains from the presence of
income-linked assets can be substantial (above 1% of certainty-equivalent consumption), the assets
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The problem of smoothinghousehold consumptionﬂuctuations lies at the heart of much public
policy. A wide range of government programs and institutions, from central banks to unemploy-
ment insurance to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, ultimately owe their existence to the
goal of reducing household consumption volatility. In spite of these efforts, household consump-
tion volatility remains signiﬁcant.
In this paper, we analyze a market-based approach to reducing consumption risk: ﬁnancial as-
sets with payoffs tied to households’ labor income realizations or, as we call them, income-linked
assets. We investigate the use of such assets in the context of a calibrated life-cycle model of con-
sumption and portfolio choice, in which households can invest in different assets and can borrow
butat asubstantialpremiumtotherisklessrateofreturn. Weﬁnd thatthebeneﬁts ofincome-linked
assets can be sizeable, but are highly sensitive to the precise design of the assets. For example,
the seemingly innocuous decision of whether to link income negatively to the return on a savings
instrument or positively to the interest rate on a loan has a large impact on the welfare gains our
model predicts. The intuition here is that in a world with realistic frictions, one cannot separate
the effect of an asset on consumption across states of nature with the effect on consumption across
time. For instance, an asset that needs to be purchased today to provide insurance against future
shocks reduces the variabilityof future consumptionbut also increases future consumptionrelative
to current consumption. In a frictionless world, households can borrow to undo such an intertem-
poral distortion, but in a realistic world where borrowing is expensive, households may not want
to invest in such an asset in spite of the reduction in future consumption variability.
The reason why such assets deserve consideration is that risk sharing between households is
limited, as evidenced by the fact that much of observed household consumption volatility is due
to idiosyncratic income shocks, not aggregate income ﬂuctuations. This limited risk sharing can
be seen either as a puzzle or as evidence of frictions. Chief among the frictions is asymmetric
information, in particular moral hazard: if one knew that one’s consumption is independent of
one’s income, there is of course no longer a strong incentive to expend effort on trying to avoid
negative income shocks, such as being ﬁred for shirking.
However, in principle there is scope for sharing part of one’s labor income risk without induc-
ing moral hazard, as part of this risk is group-speciﬁc. Groups could be deﬁned, for instance, in
2terms of occupation, industry, region, or education level. As an example, an auto worker may ex-
perience an income shock because of his individual job performance, but also because the overall
evolution of the demand for cars affects the average wage of auto workers, which is beyond his
control. Shocks of the second kind are observable and veriﬁable, so that insurance-like contracts
based on such risks can, in principle, easily be written. Indeed, Attanasio and Davis (1996) argue
for the “puzzle” view of the limited risk sharing present in the data precisely because they ﬁnd
that a particular group-level shock — income variation at the education-sex-birth cohort level —
appears not to be shared across households. One reason why the sharing of such risks that are
immune to moral hazard may be difﬁcult is the possible importance of another friction, namely
limited commitment: if two individuals sign a contract in which they promise to share their re-
spective incomes with each other, the one receiving a high positive income shock may be tempted
to renege on the promise, even if afterwards he gets punished by being excluded from future sim-
ilar transactions. This issue can be mitigated by moving from bilateral contracts to trading such
risks through long-lived institutions that hold a diversiﬁed portfolio and have strong reputational
concerns, so that they are very unlikely to default. This solution makes the market-based approach
considered in this paper a potentially promising way to share household income risks.
The income-linked assets we consider take two basic forms. The ﬁrst is a standard insurance-
like contract in which an individual pays something now for an asset whose future payoff is neg-
atively correlated with the individual’s income innovations — we call this an “income-hedging
instrument.” Thus, if the individual’s group receives a negative income shock, this asset will pay
off more than if the group receives a positive shock. The second form we consider are “income-
linked loans,” where the required repayment is positively correlated with one’s group’s income
shocks. Either way, the upshot of adding such assets to a household portfolio would be to re-
duce consumption ﬂuctuations. Our contribution in this paper is a quantitative evaluation of what
households’ demand for such assets would be, and which design features of the assets this demand
most strongly depends on. Furthermore, we assess the size of the welfare gains that the presence
of such assets would generate for households.
Our undertaking, and the assets we consider, are inspired by two thought-provoking books
by Robert Shiller (1993, 2003) in which he argues for the development of new household risk
3management instruments.3 He also furnishes the motivationfor our study, as he writes that “Imag-
ining the social and economic achievement that could come from a new ﬁnancial order is difﬁcult
because we have not seen such an alternate world.”4 Of course, our model-based approach is pre-
cisely an attempt to predict what might happen in an alternate world. Understanding the potential
welfare gains from such assets, and what these beneﬁts depend on, is also important from a policy
perspective because Shiller argues that we require a concerted effort from the government and the
private sector to facilitate the introduction of such assets.
To evaluate the demand for and the usefulness of the income-linked assets, we embed them
in a realistic portfolio choice problem. We use a ﬁnite horizon, partial equilibrium model which
roughly matches basic facts about households’risky asset holdings. Households receive stochastic
labor income, which is subject to permanent and transitory shocks, and they can invest in bonds
and stocks. Furthermore, they can also engage in unsecured borrowing at an interest rate that
exceeds the return on the riskless bond.
A signiﬁcant challenge for this research is the need to make assumptions about the return
characteristics of assets that do not yet exist. For the mean returns of the income-linked assets,
we make the baseline assumption that the risks upon which the payoffs are based are purely cross-
sectional, such that the assets can be priced fairly. Thus, we assume that the mean return on
the income-hedging instrument equals the mean return on the risk-free bond, and that the mean
interest rate to be paid on the income-linked loan is equal to the interest rate on other unsecured
householddebt.5 Fortheotherreturncharacteristics, weremainrelativelyagnosticandsimplyplug
in different values for the volatility of the returns on the income-linked assets and their correlation
with the permanent shock to a household’s labor income. We do, however, present some back-
of-the-envelope calculations that lead us to adopt as our baseline assumption a correlation of 0.5
3We onlyconsiderasubset ofShiller’s proposals. Ourincome-hedginginstrumentcanbeseen eitheras “livelihood
insurance” or as a particular example of a “macro market.” In addition to these two, and the income-linked loans
that we also look at, Shiller’s other suggestions include “home equity insurance” (which is now arguably available,
through an exchange-traded product based on the Case-Shiller index), “inequality insurance,” and “intergenerational
social security.”
4Shiller (2003), p.10.
5An alternative to our partial equilibrium approach would be to build a general equilibrium asset-pricing model to
generatepricesfortheassets, but thewell-documentedproblemswith suchmodelsin generatingpricesevenin-sample
meanthatmisspeciﬁcationofeitherthehouseholddecisionproblemorthegeneralequilibriumcouldleadtoinaccurate
predictions about the beneﬁts of the assets. Another advantage of the partial equilibrium setting is that it allows us to
explore the effects of different assumptions about the prices of other assets on the beneﬁts of income-linked assets.
4between individual permanent labor income shocks and the returns on income-linked assets.
Our calibrated model yields two main results. The ﬁrst is that the beneﬁts that income-linked
assets could generate for households are very sensitive to the parameters of the return process.
Most importantly, potential welfare gains are strongly convex in the assumed correlation between
rates and income shocks. As a consequence, unless the correlation is very high, the income-linked
assets can only eliminatea rather small part of the welfare cost imposed by incomeshocks overthe
life cycle. The attractiveness of our assets further depends on the assumed return volatility, with
higher volatility providing “more bang for the buck” for households. The size of the cost differ-
ential between borrowing and lending is also very important: the larger it is, the less households
gain from having access to the proposed income-linked assets.
The second main result is that income-linked loans are generally much more appealing and
useful to households than the income-hedging instrument. For a baseline calibration in which the
correlation between permanent income shocks and the interest rate on the income-linked assets is
0.5, and the volatility of the rate is 0.5, we ﬁnd that income-linked loans would produce a welfare
improvement of 1.4% (an increase in consumption of about 400 USD per year, in 2009 dollars)
while the income-hedging instrument is essentially worthless. We also explore the boundaries
of this result. For instance, we show that the attractiveness of the alternative investment option
matters for the relative appeal of the two income-linked assets: the presence of equity (as in our
baseline) makes the income-linked loan relatively more attractive (as households can invest some
of the borrowed money in a high return asset) while the income-hedging instrument is in less
demand than if equity were not available. If a household has access to borrowing at a cheap rate
(lower than what it would have to pay on average on the income-linked loan), the ranking of the
two assets may be reversed, such that the income-hedging instrument is more valuable. However,
even under such assumptions, the gains from the income-hedging instrument remain moderate
(below 1%). In sum, we ﬁnd that under some assumptions, the gains to households from having
access to income-linked loans could be signiﬁcant, while it is more difﬁcult to come up with a
scenario in which income-hedging instruments would have an equally positive effect on welfare.
To understand these results, we turn to the theory of portfolio choice in the presence of con-
straints and focus on the risk-adjusted returns on assets. The higher the correlation of an asset with
householdincome,thelowertherisk-adjustedreturnonthatasset. Thus, thenegativecorrelationof
5the income-hedging instrument raises the risk-adjusted return and makes the asset more attractive
to investors than a risk-free asset with thesame mean return. Similarly, income-linked loans have a
lower risk-adjusted cost of funds than borrowing at a ﬁxed rate. However, even though the two as-
sets are equally attractive in terms of intratemporal consumption smoothing, whether households
will demand them also depends on how theassets squarewith households’desirefor intertemporal
smoothing. We show that over the life cycle, income-linked loans are more attractivein that regard
than income-hedging instruments. The reason is that early in the life cycle, most households’main
ﬁnancial activity is high-interest rate borrowing (because they want to consume part of the higher
income they expect in the future), for which income-linked loans provide a lower-cost alternative.
To attract interest, the income-hedging instrument, in contrast, would need to offer a risk-adjusted
return that exceeds the cost of unsecured debt. Later in life, the competition for funds comes not
from high-interest borrowing but from high equity returns. Then, the risk-adjusted return on the
income-hedging instrument must exceed the risk-adjusted return on equity, and if we set expected
equity returns to match historical averages, that is a tall order as well. Meanwhile, the presence
of high-return equity makes the income-linked loans relatively more attractive to households, as it
means that they can insure at relatively low cost by taking out an income-linked loan and investing
most of it in equity.
Given that some calibrations of our model predict substantial beneﬁts from income-linked
loans, an obvious question is why such loans are not more frequently observed in the real world.6
We ﬁrst reiteratethat we assumehere thattherisks householdsare hedging areboth observableand
cross-sectional. The former implies that there are no adverse selection or moral hazard problems
and when combined with the latter, means that no risk premium needs to be added to the risk-free
rates.7 One can view this as an extreme assumption which stacks the deck in favor of income-
linked assets and makes the failure of the income-hedging instrument even more surprising than it
6Some examples of particular forms of income-linked loans do exist in the real world. For instance, in Australia
and some other countries, there exist education loans for which the required repayment is based on subsequent labor
income. In the United States, there have been recent examples of car ﬁrms (Hyundai, Ford) offering to make car
payments for up to a year and/or take the car back with no loss in equity in case the buyer loses his job.
7As our focus is on the beneﬁts that income-linked assets could generate for households, we do not directly
address what entities would be willing to offer these assets at such prices. One candidate would be investment ﬁrms
that already manage the retirement funds of people in a wide variety of occupations. Alternatively, income-hedging
instruments could be operationalized as exchange-traded products, or they could be offered by insurance companies
(which would presumably add loadings and thus offer rates that are less than actuarially fair).
6already is.
Shiller(2003)advances anotherreasonfor thecurrent nonexistenceoftheincome-linkedassets
he envisions, arguing that until recently we did not have the technology necessary to collect and
maintain the data underlying the various proposed instruments. He points out that there will likely
be a need for government intervention to help establish what he calls “Global Risk Information
Databases,” and that new regulations may need to be enacted in order to make the “New Financial
Order” possible—for instance, a change in the bankruptcy law, such that income-linked loans
could not be canceled by declaring personal bankruptcy.8
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next subsection, we discuss some of the
related literature. We then turn to a two-period model, in order to explain the theory of portfolio
choice under constraints and to provide intuition for our results on the use of and gain from the
assets we introduce. Section 3 then describes our life-cycle model and the quantitative results we
obtain from it, which are further discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 brieﬂy concludes.
1.1. Related Literature
Risk sharing is one of the fundamental topics of economics and ﬁnance and therefore much
too vast to be surveyed here. We will therefore concentrate on referencing some classic and recent
papers that we deem particularly relevant or related to our analysis. We begin by discussing papers
that focus on measuring the extent of risk sharing or on the welfare cost of income or wage risk,
and then consider papers on households’ life-cycle portfolio choice that are more closely related
to our model.
Classic empirical papers on the degree of risk sharing between households include Cochrane
(1991), Attanasio and Davis (1996), and Hayashi et al. (1996). These authors all attempt to assess
the degree to which household consumptionis insured against shocks to income, and ﬁnd that such
insurance is far from perfect (if it were not, there would of course be no need for new ﬁnancial
instruments that facilitate better insurance). In a related vein, papers by Blundell and Preston
(1998), Krueger and Perri (2006), Blundell et al. (2008), and Heathcote et al. (2008b) use both
income and consumption data to examine the evolution of income risk and inequality over the
8Income-linked loans would then have a similar status as student loans. This change in the bankruptcy law may
be necessary because otherwise, individuals are tempted to default on their income-linked loans after they receive a
positive income shock.
7past decades, the degree of households’ insurance against income risk, and the different channels
through which such insurance can be achieved.
In quantitativedynamic macro models that are calibrated to match empirical data9, the welfare
cost of income uncertainty is typically very large. For instance, Storesletten et al. (2004) use
a model that is calibrated to match the empirically observed evolution of household income and
consumptioninequalityoverthelifecycleto determinetherelativeimportanceof initialconditions
and life-cycle shocks for inequality, and ﬁnd that in their model, an agent would be willing to give
up 26% of lifetime consumption in exchange for insurance against all life-cycle shocks. Pijoan-
Mas (2006)studies a general equilibriumproductioneconomy with inﬁnitely-livedagents, ﬂexible
labor supply, and stationary wage shocks, and ﬁnds that complete markets (meaning full insurance
against wage risks) would lead to a welfare gain equivalent to increasing lifetime consumption by
16%. In a related paper, Heathcote et al. (2008a)ﬁnd that in amodel with permanent and transitory
wage shocks the welfare gain from complete markets would be almost 40% of expected lifetime
consumption.10 Their conclusion is thus the following: “From a policy perspective, an important
implication is that the government should develop the legal and institutional frameworks that will
allow new insurance markets to develop” (p. 520).
The papers referenced above and, in general, most quantitative general equilibrium macro
models, only feature a rather simple asset market structure (often composed of only one asset).
We opt to go the partial equilibrium route, which has the advantage of allowing for more realistic
asset market structures but at the cost of taking returns as exogenously given, an assumption that
is somewhat intellectually unsatisfying and may also yield misleading results in counterfactual
exercises.11 Our model builds on other computational analyses of optimal portfolio choice over
the life cycle, some well-known examples of which include Bertaut and Haliassos (1997), Cocco
et al. (2005), Gomes and Michaelides (2005), or Davis et al. (2006), which is the model we will
9For an excellent recent summary of this literature, see Heathcote et al. (2009)
10They emphasize that in their model, this gain is more than twice as large as the gain from completely eliminating
all risk (for instance, throughdistortionarytaxation), because the latter would take away the opportunityto proﬁt from
temporarily high wages by increasing labor supply.
11For our exercise of evaluating the potential use and usefulness of new assets, one justiﬁcation for using partial
equilibrium instead of general equilibrium, which would allow for endogenous responses of the other asset returns, is
that the world would most likely not move to the new general equilibrium very quickly. Rather, the new assets would
need to be introduced into, and used in, the current equilibrium, which is captured by our calibrations.
8buildon. Some papers in thisliterature explicitlyinvestigatethe welfare effects dueto the presence
or absence of certain assets or government policies. Perhaps closest in spirit to our work are recent
papers byDeJonget al.(2008)and Cocco and Gomes(2009).12 DeJonget al. considerthewelfare
beneﬁts generated by the presence of housing futures and ﬁnd these gains are small (mostly due
to the signiﬁcant fraction of house price risk that is idiosyncratic). Cocco and Gomes investigate
the role that longevity bonds (for which no liquid market currently exists) could play in individual
portfolios, what the welfare beneﬁts from such bonds would be, and the optimal design of such
bonds.
2. Two-Period Model
To gain someintuitionfor how the introductionof theincome-linked assets mightaffect house-
holds’assetportfoliosandwelfare, weﬁrstconsiderasimpletwo-periodmodel. Westartbybrieﬂy
discussing the theory of optimal portfolio choice in the setting we are interested in13, and then look
at an example with a calibration similar to the one we will be using in the life-cycle model. As
will be shown in later sections of the paper, the results from the two-period model largely carry
over to the more complex setting.
2.1. Theory
Suppose an investor who lives for two periods has some cash-on-hand in period 1 and expects
to receive a stochastic income in period 2 with mean E(Y2) and standard deviation σY2. The ob-
jective is to maximize his overall expected utility, u(c1) + βE[u(c2)]. The investor has access to
I ﬁnancial assets, with stochastic or deterministic returns. Finally, assume that the state space is
ﬁnite-dimensional. We ﬁrst consider the optimal policy of an investor who faces no constraints
(other than the budget constraint) on his asset holdings between the two periods. In this case,
the optimal policy can be understood in terms of a simple algorithm. Start with any admissible
asset allocation, which will imply a consumption stream {c1
t+1,...,cS
t+1} for the S states of the
world. Based on this consumption stream, one can deﬁne the “risk-neutral” or “martingale” prob-
ability measure, which reweights the objective probabilities of the different states by their relative
12Other examples include Campbell et al. (2001) and Gomes et al. (2007, 2008).

















Then, for any asset i ∈ {1,...,I}, we can deﬁne its “risk-adjusted” (gross) return using these
risk-neutral probabilities: EQ[ ˜ Ri]. Intuitively, this measure adjusts an asset’s mean return by how
useful it is for consumption smoothing across states of the world. Thus, an asset that has a high
payoff in states of the world in which consumption is low, and marginal utility therefore high, has
a higher risk-adjusted return than an asset that has the same average return but pays off more in
states of the world in which consumption is high.





This is the minimum interest rate at which an investor would be willing to decrease his consump-
tion in period t by a small amount ǫ if in return he received Rǫ in period t + 1 (or, equivalently,
the highest rate at which he would be willing to borrow ǫ for consumption in t if he had to repay
Rǫ in t + 1). This rate is higher the more the investor expects consumption to grow between t
and t + 1, and (for utility functions such that marginal utility u′ is convex) the less uncertain he is
about consumption in t+1. Thus, the shadow rate is inﬂuenced by the investor’s desire to smooth
consumption across periods and across states of nature within a period.
Optimal portfolio choice can then be characterized by the following simple rule: investors
should optimally add to (subtract from, leave unchanged) their position in an asset i if and only
if the risk-adjusted return on that asset exceeds (falls short of, equals) the shadow rate. Thus, the
portfolio’s overall optimality requires EQ[ ˜ Ri] = R ∀i. Furthermore, if the set of available assets
includes one that is risk-free, so that investors can borrow and lend potentially unlimited quantities
at the risk-free rate, the shadow rate will be equal across all investors.
Classical unconstrained portfolio choice is easy to understand. However, limits on the quanti-
ties of assets the investor can hold, such as short-sales or borrowing constraints, make things more
complicated. It may now be the case that the investor would like to sell an asset that has a low
10risk-adjusted return for him, but cannot do so because of short-sales constraints. Alternatively, he
may want to buy more of an asset (because the asset has a high risk-adjusted return) but is unable
to do so because he has already invested all his wealth in that asset and cannot borrow to fund
more investment.
If such constraints are present, which is arguably the most realistic case, optimal asset holdings
will depend on an investor’s current wealth position and future income process, and shadow rates
will differ across investors with different characteristics. Obviously, it also follows that for a given
investor, risk-adjusted returns will generally differ across assets.
For instance, assume that the only available assets are risk-free borrowing and lending, at rates
Rb and Rl respectively, with Rb > Rl and the constraints that b ≤ 0 and l ≥ 0. Then, a relatively
poor investor will borrow today, which means that his shadow rate R equals Rb and exceeds Rl —
if he could, he would like to set l < 0, but he cannot do so. Likewise, a relatively rich investor
lends today and has R = Rl < Rb, as he cannot set b > 0.
Now, suppose we add to this setting the possibility of investing in an income-hedging instru-
ment (IHI) with E[ ˜ RIHI] = Rl and corr( ˜ RIHI,Y2) < 0. In a world with incomplete markets, we
would typically have EQ[ ˜ RIHI] > Rl, because consumption tracks income. As a consequence,
if relatively poor investors could borrow at Rl, it would always be worth it for them to do so in
order to buy the IHI. Likewise, relatively rich investors who would otherwise save at Rl would
now instead invest in the IHI. However, as discussed above, in the real world it is very possible
that people are borrowing at a higher rate, such that R = Rb, or they may even be maxed out on
their borrowing, such that R > Rb. In such cases, it is far from clear that EQ[ ˜ RIHI] > R, so that
the investor may not want to hold the IHI. Similarly, relatively rich investors may have access to
other investment opportunities, such as equity, which offer higher risk-adjusted returns than the
IHI.
To summarize, in order to determine whether investors will demand an income-linked asset
(or any other asset), we need to know the risk-adjusted return on this asset and compare it to the
investors’ shadow rate. An asset’s risk-adjusted return depends on how helpful it is for consump-
tion smoothing across states, while investors’ shadow rates are driven by their desire to smooth
consumption across states and time. The shadow rates thus depends on investors’ current wealth
position, their expected future income and its riskiness, and the return processes of the other assets
11they have access to.
2.2. Example
An investor starts life with some cash-on-hand in period 1 and will receive a stochastic income
in period 2 with mean 8 and standard deviation 1.5.14 The investorhas an isoelasticutility function
with relative risk aversion of 2, and does not discount the future.
As a benchmark, suppose that he can borrow at rb = 8%, save at rl = 2%, and invest in equity
with an expected return of E(˜ re) = 6% and a standard deviation of 16%.15
The top left panel of ﬁgure 1 displays the investor’s optimal asset holdings as a function of his
cash-on-hand in period 1. As his goal is to smooth consumption over the two periods, he borrows
if he is relatively poor in period 1, and saves (by investing in equity) if he is relatively rich. Using
the terminology from the previous subsection, the shadow rate equals 8% in the cash-on-hand
region where the investor borrows, then falls to 6% (the mean return on equity) at the point where
the investor starts investing in equity, and then further decreases in cash-on-hand. As rb > E(˜ re),
the investor does not borrow to invest in equity nor engages in risk-free saving (but he would do
so if he were more risk averse or had very high cash-on-hand).
The top right panel shows the optimal asset holdings if in addition to the assets from the
benchmark model, the investor has access to an IHI with E(˜ rIHI) = rl = 2%, standard deviation
25%, and a negative return correlation of 0.5 with second-period income. Thus, the IHI tends to
pay off more when the investor experiences a negative income shock and pays less if his income
exceeds expectations. The optimal policy features positive holdings of the IHI at low levels of
cash-on-hand, ﬁnanced by additional borrowing. As cash-on-hand increases, holdings of the IHI
decrease, and for cash-on-hand levels between 5.5 and 7.3 equal zero. At higher levels of cash-on-
hand, the IHI holdings become positive again, and eventually the investor simultaneously holds
both the IHI and equity. IHI holdings continue to increase in cash-on-hand even for higher levels
14Y2 can take the values {5.4,8,10.6} with respective probabilities {1/6,2/3,1/6}.
15There is no exogenously imposed borrowing limit, but we require the investor to pay back his debt in period 2.
Given our assumed possible values for income in period 2, this means the investor can borrow at most 5.4/(1 + rb)
(or more if he hedges his income risk). It may seem odd that rb > rl even though there is no default in the model.
However, there are many reasons other than losses from defaults for why borrowing costs exceed lending rates, such
as transaction costs or the cost that lenders face in the screening of potential borrowers (with the goal of lowering
default risk).
12of cash-on-hand than depicted in the graph, up to a point at which the variance of cash-on-hand in
the next period cannot be decreased any further by higher IHI holdings. As a consequence, equity
holdings are lower than in the benchmark case.
In the lower left panel, we instead add the possibility of borrowing through an income-linked
loan (ILL). We assume that this loan features a stochastic interest rate with mean E(˜ rILL) = rb =
8%, standard deviation 25%, and a positive correlation of 0.5 with income in period 2. Thus,
when taking out an ILL, the investor will need to repay a larger amount if his income is higher
than expected in the next period and a lower amount if his income falls short of expectations. The
ﬁgure shows that the investor makes quite extensive use of the ILL. For low levels of current cash-
on-hand, borrowing through the ILL mostly replaces ﬁxed-rate borrowing, but does not lead to
much additional total borrowing.16 For a large intermediate range of cash-on-hand, however, there
is now more borrowing (through the ILL) than there was at the ﬁxed rate. Also, over this range,
the investor takes a larger position in equity as compared with the benchmark case.
Interestingly, demands for both the IHI in panel 2 and the ILL in panel 3 are non-monotonic
in cash-on-hand. While this may be surprising at ﬁrst glance, it is a general feature of portfolio
choice problems with short-selling constraints. The reason is that due to these constraints, and the
types of assets available, the shadow rate may stay constant over some ranges of cash-on-hand but
decreases over others, and sometimes discontinuously falls when a constraint is hit.
Thelowerrightpanel inﬁgure1displaysthewelfaregainsfromhavingaccesstooneofthetwo
income-linked assets in this example. Welfare is measured in terms of certainty-equivalent (CE)
consumption, which is deﬁned as the constant consumption stream that would provide the same
lifetimeutilityas therisky stream theinvestoractually expects. As can be seen, both assets provide
higher gains for relatively poor investors than for rich ones. Also, over most of the cash-on-hand
range depicted, the ILL provides higher welfare gains over the benchmark case than does the IHI.
Here is some intuition for why this is the case. First consider a case in which the investor has little
cash-on-handintheﬁrst period. When hehas access totheincome-linkedloan, heusesitinsteadof
risk-free borrowing. Given that the ILL has the same expected cost (as we assume E(˜ rILL) = rb)
but provides additional insurance beneﬁts as compared with standard borrowing, the ILL clearly is
16The ILL does not fully replace ﬁxed-rate borrowing because that would be too risky, given the imperfect correla-
tion of the interest rate with next period’s income.
13a good deal for the investor. As his cash-on-hand increases, he keeps borrowing through the ILL,
but now also invests in equity, which has a slightly lowerexpected return than the expected interest
rate on the ILL. As such, the insurance provided by the ILL becomes somewhat more “expensive.”
For high cash-on-hand levels, ILL borrowing decreases to zero, so that investors in that range
do not gain from having access to the ILL. IHI holdings, on the other hand, are ﬁnanced through
expensiveborrowingat lowcash-on-handlevels,and reduceequityholdingsat higherlevels. Thus,
intuitively, the (opportunity) cost of holding the IHI is higher than for the ILL. However, note that
IHI holdings do not go to zero as cash-on-hand increases — even for rich investors, hedging next
period’s income risk has some value (though the welfare gains in this example are minuscule).17
Thus, for such investors, the IHI is preferred to the ILL.
The previous discussion hints at the role of equity in this model: it makes the ILL relatively
more attractive (by lowering its effective cost) and the IHI relatively less attractive (because the
opportunity cost of investing in the IHI is higher than if only risk-free saving were available).
Indeed, if no equity were available in our example, relatively rich investors (with cash-on-hand
above 7.3 in this example), would hold more of the IHI, and borrow less through the ILL than in
the case depicted in ﬁgure 1. As a consequence, for such investors the IHI would lead to larger
welfare gains and the ILL to lower welfare gains than shown in the ﬁgure.18
One can also compare the welfare gains from the two assets with the welfare gain that would
result from completely eliminating income risk (that is, the investor is certain to receive an income
of 8 in the second period). With the parameters we assumed, this gain would be much larger
than the ones depicted: for an investor with no cash-on-hand, the gain in CE consumption would
equal 9.2%, while an investor with cash-on-hand of 5 would gain 2.8% and one with cash-on-
hand of 10 about 1.4%. Thus, the assets we introduce reap rather little of the potential gains.
What accounts for this result? Part of the explanation is provided by the imperfect correlation of
the rates of return with the income shock. As table 1 shows, if the rates are perfectly correlated
17This is because the risk-adjusted return on equity declines in equity holdings and thus tends towards rl as cash-
on-hand increases. The risk-adjusted return on IHI decreases as well in holdings, and always remains weakly above
rl, so that optimal IHI holdings do not decline as cash-on-hand goes up.
18Thegainsin CEconsumptionfromtheIHIwouldaverageabout0.25%foraninvestorwithcash-on-handbetween
10 and 15, for instance, while the welfare gains from ILL would be zero for such an investor, as he would not borrow
through the ILL at all.
14with the income shock, the gains provided by the two income-linked assets move signiﬁcantly
towards the gains that an elimination of income shocks would provide. This is particularly true for
relatively poor investors; rich investors still gain less. Also, the table conﬁrms that for relatively
poor investors, the ILL is more useful while for rich ones, the IHI leads to higher welfare gains.
Table 1’s lines 5–8 further showthe effect morevolatileIHI or ILL returns will haveon welfare
gains. Clearly, givenourearlier discussionofopportunitycosts, it isnot surprisingthat theseassets
become more useful if their returns are more volatile, as one then has to hold less of them to obtain
the same insurance. However, the table also demonstrates two additional points. First, the welfare
gains from the ILL seem less strongly affected by the increase in volatility than the ones from the
IHI. Second, higher volatility has a relatively larger positive effect on welfare the more strongly
returns and income are correlated. This is intuitive: an asset that is highly volatile but only offers
an imperfect hedge against income risk also adds risk. Thus, even though an increase in volatility
never lowers the welfare gains provided by an asset, it may be that it does not increase welfare
gains or only slightly so.
In the remainder of the paper, we will show that the main points discussed in this section
carry over to a more realistic life-cycle setting. The demand for income-linked assets, and the
welfare gains achieved by their presence, will be very sensitive to the parameters of the return
process. Also, the welfare gains we ﬁnd will be rather small for the parametrizations we deem
most realistic (particularly as compared with the hypothetical gain from completely eliminating




Our strategy in this part is as follows: We start out with a life-cycle portfolio choice model
with realistic borrowing and investment opportunities. We show that this model generates pre-
dictions regarding borrowing and equity holdings that are roughly consistent with the data. We
then introduce new assets into this model, one at a time, and analyze what the demand for these
assets would be, how these would affect the demand for the other assets in the model, and what
the predicted welfare gains from the new assets would be.
15The speciﬁc portfolio choice model that we build on is the one by Davis et al. (2006). This
model explicitly accounts for the fact that the typical household has access to unsecured credit,
albeit at a higher interest rate than the lending rate or the expected rate of return on equity. Young
households, who expect to earn higher incomes in the future, typically take advantage of this bor-
rowing opportunity in order to smooth their consumption over time. However, this borrowing
slows down the speed at which households accumulate wealth, and reduces their rate of participa-
tion in equity markets until about age 45. As a consequence, this model generates more realistic
predictions than models that allow for no borrowing or, at the other extreme, borrowing at the
risk-free lending rate. Furthermore, this is accomplished without a need to rely on implausible
preference parameters.
Thebasicingredientsofourlife-cycleconsumptionand portfoliochoicemodelarethestandard
ones used in this literature. The household life cycle consists of two phases, work and retirement.
Retirement age is assumed to be exogenous, at tR. During working years, log labor income (˜ yt)
evolves as the sum of a deterministic component (dt), a random walk component (˜ ηt), and an i.i.d.
transitory shock (˜ εt):
˜ yt = dt + ˜ ηt + ˜ εt for t ≤ tR, (1)
where ˜ ηt = ηt−1 + ˜ νt, with ˜ νt ∼N(−σ2
ν/2,σ2
ν), and ˜ εt ∼N(−σ2
ε/2,σ2
ε). Thus, ∆˜ yt is an MA(1)
process. During retirement, it is assumed that the household receives a constant fraction λ of its
permanent income in the last year of work: ˜ yt = log(λ) + dtR + ηtR for t > tR.






in each period t, where U( ) is an isoelastic (power) utility function with curvature γ, β is the
constant discount factor, and α is a “taste shifter” that we include mainly to account for the drop
in consumption when entering retirement.19 We assume that the household dies with certainty at
age T, and do not include stochastic death or a bequest motive in our model.
19The taste shifter can be seen as a stand-in for a more elaborate model with labor supply. For instance, Cocco and
Gomes (2009) use αt = L
ζ
t, which generates a consumption drop at retirement, because leisure and consumption are
substitutes in the utility function if γ > 1.
16Thefollowingexpressiongivesthebudgetconstraintofahouseholdat aget, in itsmostgeneral
form:
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Households can always trade at least three ﬁnancial assets. They can buy equity (e) with a
stochastic return ˜ re (= ˜ Re,t − 1), save (l) at a net risk-free rate of return rl, and borrow (b) at a
ﬁxed risk-free interest rate rb. We will refer to the version of the model in which only these three
assets are available as the benchmark case.
Wethenaddan additionalﬁnancial assettothismodel. Theﬁrstpossibleadditionisan income-
hedging instrument which has a stochastic return ˜ rIHI that is negatively correlated with the per-
manent income shock the household receives. We vary this correlation, as well as the volatility
of the interest rate, to see how these parameters affect the demand for and the welfare gains from
the asset. The other addition is income-linked loans, which offer another way for the household to
borrow. They are different from risk-free borrowing in that their interest rate ˜ rILL is stochastic and
positively correlated with the permanent income shock the household receives. We only consider
assets that correlate with the household’s permanent income shock, because in models such as
ours, the transitory shock is usually smoothed out easily by the household and has very little effect
on welfare or asset allocations.
We do not impose an exogenous borrowing constraint, but require that households be able to
repay their debt with probability 1 by the time they die, so that bT = ILLT = 0 (this is usually
referred to as the “natural debt limit”). Thus, in our model households never default on their debt.
Another simplifying assumption of the model is that it ignores housing and secured (mortgage)
borrowing. Given that a large proportion of households hold much of their wealth in housing, this
leads the model to overpredict equity holdings. However, apart from that, we do not believe that
17omitting housing and mortgages from the analysis has a large inﬂuence on our results.20
3.2. Welfare and Insurance Measures
We employ different measures to determine how “useful” the assets we introduce are for a
household. First, we will analyze what demand the model predicts for these assets (meaning how
much households would hold on average at different stages of the life cycle). However, this does
not tell us much about the welfare beneﬁts from the new assets.
A better measure (which is standard in the literature) is the gain in certainty-equivalent (CE)
consumption due to the introduction of a new asset. CE consumption is computed as follows: We
ﬁrst compute the (ex-ante) lifetime expected utility ¯ U in a given environment. Then, we ﬁnd the
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Finally, we will also use the measure of partial insurance against permanent shocks proposed
by Kaplan and Violante (forthcoming). Deﬁne the insurance coefﬁcient at age t as
φ
ν




where cit is log consumption, νit the innovation to the permanent component of log income, and
variances and covariances are taken over the cross-section of simulated households at age t. The
interpretation of this coefﬁcient is intuitive: the lower it is, the more a permanent income shock
translates into consumption changes. If φν
t = 0, consumption adjusts one-for-one with permanent
income. On the other hand, φν
t = 1 would mean “perfect insurance” in the sense that households’
consumption growth is completely independent of the particular shock they experience.
20Mortgagesusuallycomeata lowerinterestrate thantheunsecuredborrowingwefocusonin ourmodel. However,
except perhaps over the past few years, mortgages are usually taken out with the sole purpose of buying a primary
residence, not to smooth consumption or invest the borrowed money in equity or other assets. Nevertheless, in
section 3.4.4 we consider a calibration in which households have access to low-cost borrowing, for instance through
home-equity loans.
183.3. Calibration and Discretization
Table 2 gives an overview of the parameter values we use to calibrate the model. For the labor
income process, we use the parameters from Cocco et al. (2005) for high school graduates, which
in this literature have been accepted as somewhat of a standard. The deterministic component of
income, dt, is given by a third-order polynomial in age, the standard deviations of the permanent
and transitory shock are set to 0.103 and 0.272, respectively, and the replacement rate λ equals
0.682. Householdsenterthemodelatage20, retireimmediatelyafterage65, anddiewithcertainty
atage80. Figure2displaysthemeanincomeoverthelifecycleaswellasonesimulatedrealization
(to give a sense of the signiﬁcant extent of income uncertainty households face).
The preference parameters in our main calibration are set as follows: relative risk aversion γ
(equal to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the assumed isoelastic utility
function) is assumed to equal 2. The discount factor β is chosen such that the mean wealth-to-
income ratio of households with a head aged 50 to 59 in the model’s benchmark case where only
equity, unsecured borrowing, and risk-free saving are available, matches its empirical counterpart
of 2.6 (Laibson et al. 2007).21 This yields β = 0.936. The taste shifterα equals 1 before retirement
and 0.9 afterwards; this generates a mean consumption drop at retirement of about 10 percent,
which is consistent with most empirical estimates.
For asset returns, we make the same assumptions as in the two-period example earlier. We
set the annual return on risk-free saving, rl equal to 2% per year, and the mean equity premium,
E(˜ re) − rl to 4%, which are customary values in this literature. The standard deviation of equity
returns, σe, is set to 16%. For simplicity, equity returns are assumed to be uncorrelated with labor
income shocks, though relaxing this assumption and setting the correlation equal to an empirically
reasonable value (for instance 0.15, as in Gomes and Michaelides 2005) has very little effect on
our results. The interest rate on risk-free borrowing, rb, is set equal to 8%, which is what Davis
et al. (2006) choose based on empirical data in which they ﬁnd an interest rate differential between
the risk-free lending rate and the mean rate on unsecured borrowing of approximately 6%, after
adjusting for tax considerations and charge-offs.
We solve the model using numerical methods. The algorithm is similar to the one used by
21The empirical wealth measure used to obtain this number includes claims on deﬁned contribution pension plans,
butnotSocialSecuritywealthorclaimsondeﬁnedbeneﬁtplans,whichareincludedinourretirementincomemeasure.
19Davis et al. (2006). Depending on the asset market assumptions, there are three or four sources of
randomness in our model: the permanent income shock, the temporary income shock, the equity
return shock, and the income-linked asset rate shock. We discretize the state space using Gaussian
quadrature, with two nodes for the labor income shocks, three for the equity return, and four for
the income-linked asset return. This is not restrictive: using ﬁve nodes for each shock does not
qualitatively alter the results (but signiﬁcantly increases computation time).22 All the results we
report are based on simulationof the life cycle for 5,000 households, using the same random draws
for all parameterizations.
3.3.1. On the Labor Income Process
Clearly, if one wants to make a quantitatively appropriate assessment of the welfare burden
of labor income risk, and the welfare gains from having access to ﬁnancial instruments that can
be used to hedge part of that risk, it is important to use a realistic labor income process with
appropriate degrees of uncertainty. We follow the bulk of the existing literature and use a slightly
simpliﬁed version of the labor income process introduced by MaCurdy (1982) and Abowd and
Card (1989). This “permanent-transitory” process was popularized in the consumption literature
by Zeldes (1989), Carroll (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and has the advantage that
the life-cycle optimization problem can be normalized by permanent income, which reduces the
number of state variables and makes the model’s computational solution easier.
The main feature of the permanent-transitory income process is that there is no individual het-
erogeneity in income growth rates beyond what is captured in the deterministic component dt,
which is typically estimated separately for different education levels. However, Guvenen (2007,
2009) has recently argued that this assumption may be overly restrictive, and that allowing for
“heterogeneous income proﬁles” (HIP) can account for features of the evolution of consumption
inequality and the slopes of consumption proﬁles for different education groups over the life cycle
that otherwise would be puzzling. In Guvenen’s model, income shocks are less persistent, but
22Results would change, however, if we increased the number of possible income shock realizations a lot, so that
we would have the possibility of a shock in the very far left tail of the lognormalshock distribution. This would affect
the natural debt limit, and in the extreme case of a possible zero-income shock, eliminate borrowing altogether. We
believe that it is realistic to assume that there is a positive lower bound for income shocks, due to the presence of
social safety nets.
20individuals only learn about their personal dt over time, through observation of their realized in-
come. While his model intuitively makes a lot of sense, it is very computationally demanding; to
our knowledge, nobody has solved a version that contains more than the risk-free asset. Further-
more, Hryshko (2009) argues that the PSID income data actually reject the HIP model when it is
estimated in ﬁrst differences, while the model with a permanent component that we use cannot
be rejected. Thus, the question of which process is preferable is far from settled, and to maintain
comparability with the existing portfolio choice literature as well as computational tractability, we
stick with the status quo.
Even once the form of the income process has been determined, there remain calibration de-
cisions that are crucially important for the extent of uncertainty and the consumption and asset
proﬁles over the life cycle. In particular, the assumed variances for the permanent and transitory
shocks matter a lot. As mentioned above, we use the estimates for high school graduates by Cocco
et al. (2005). They estimate a variance of the permanent shock of σ2
ν = 0.0106 and a variance of
the transitory shock of σ2
ε = 0.0738. These estimates are quite different, for instance, from the
ones by Gourinchas and Parker (2002), who ﬁnd σ2
ν = 0.0277 and σ2
ε = 0.0431, meaning that
the relative volatility of permanent shocks is signiﬁcantly larger. Feigenbaum and Li (2009) point
out that the estimates strongly depend on the sample length of the PSID data used.23 They ﬁnd,
using the longest possible sample 1968–2001, σ2
ν = 0.009 and σ2
ε = 0.071, which is close to the
numbers we are using.24 Furthermore, they compare what these numbers imply for income uncer-
tainty over various future horizons to the results of a semi-parametric model. While the implied
uncertainty of the permanent-transitory process with the variances they estimate is somewhat too
high, its slope over different horizons seems much more appropriate than if the Gourinchas and
Parker numbers were used.
Importantly, Cocco et al. (and most other articles in this literature) use a broad deﬁnition of la-
bor income to estimate the variances of permanent and transitory income shocks. In particular, the
following additional sources of income are included in the measure of labor income they use: un-
23They note that this fact by itself may be an indication that the persistent shock follows an autoregressive process
and not a random walk.
24Gourinchas and Parker use the data of Carroll and Samwick (1997), which only comprises the PSID years 1981
to 1987. Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout use 1970 to 1992.
21employment compensation, workers’ compensation, social security, supplemental social security,
other welfare, child support, and total transfers (mainly help from relatives). Also, the incomes
of both the household head and the spouse (if present) are included. Thus, this income measure
accounts for many implicit and explicit insurance mechanisms other than asset accumulation that
are already available to households.
3.3.2. Correlation between Income-Linked Assets and Income Shocks
In our assessment of the use and usefulness of the income-linked assets, the assumed correla-
tion between the return on the income-linked asset and an individual’s labor income shock plays
a crucial role. In this subsection, we brieﬂy discuss the correlation that could realistically be
achieved if the return on the income-linked asset were solely based on an occupation-level income
index.25 The empirical question is how much of an individual’s income risk is speciﬁc to his oc-
cupation, and how much is completely idiosyncratic? In terms of our model, we can decompose
individual i’s permanent shock νit into a group-speciﬁc component ξt ∼N(−σ2
ξ/2,σ2
ξ), and an in-
dependent idiosyncratic component ωit ∼N(−σ2
ω/2,σ2
ω), such that νit = ξt + ωit.26 If we assume
that the return on the income-linked asset (ILA) is perfectly correlated with the group-speciﬁc






Thus, in addition to the total standard deviation of a person’s permanent income innovations, we
need to know the standard deviation of permanent shocks to an occupation’s income series. In
Davis et al. (2010), we use repeated cross sections of the Current Population Survey to construct
occupation-levelcomponentsofindividualincomeshocks(afterremovingpredictablecomponents
of individual income) for 17 occupational classiﬁcations that have remained largely unchanged for
25Inarelatedexercise,ShillerandSchneider(1998)usePSID datafrom1968–1987toconstructgroup-levelincome
indices after ﬁrst identifying occupation-industry groups such that only few people transition from one group to
another over time. Their preferred grouping procedure yields seven distinct groups, such as “Professional/Technical”
or “Agriculture/Labor.” They ﬁnd that changes in the index of the group an individual belongs to explain 40–50%
of individual nominal income changes at a one-year horizon (and more at a ﬁve-year horizon) after controlling for
hedonic variables, while the consumer price index only explains 20%.
26This decompositionis similar to the one used in Cocco et al. (2005),who concentrate on an aggregatecomponent
instead of a group-speciﬁc component.
22at least 35 years and for which we have a relatively large number of individuals in each survey
year.27 Although these occupations are not necessarily a representative set of occupations for the
U.S. population, we can at least get an estimate of the order of magnitude of occupation-speciﬁc
income shocks. If for simplicity we assume that all occupation-level income shocks are permanent
(an assumption that is not too far from the truth in our data — see Davis et al. 2010 for details),
we can get an estimate of σξ simply by looking at the standard deviation of annual changes to the
occupation-level income index. For the 10 occupations in our data for which at least two-thirds
of the individuals are high school graduates but not college graduates, these standard deviations
range from 0.021 (secretaries) to 0.059 (plumbers), with an average of 0.038. Given our σν of
0.103, this average implies a correlation of individual permanent income shocks with the return on
an asset that is based on an occupation-income index of slightly below 0.4.28 This estimate comes
from the best data currently available; yet it is possible that, if better and broader data sources
became available in the future, “ﬁner” indexes could be constructed which would be more highly
correlated with individual income shocks (for instance, “Plumbers located in New England”). We
take a somewhat optimistic baseline assumption, namely a correlation of 0.5. One of the main




In the benchmark case, households can borrow at a rate rb, and invest either in the risk-free
asset with a ﬁxed return rl or in equity with a stochasticreturn ˜ re. The life-cycle proﬁles, displayed
in ﬁgure 3, mirror the ones in Davis et al. (2006): households borrow substantial amounts while
27These occupations are: Accountants and Auditors; Electrical Engineers; Registered Nurses; Elementary School
Teachers; Cashiers; Secretaries; Police and Detectives; Waiters and Waitresses; Cooks; Janitors and Cleaners; Auto
Mechanics; Carpenters; Electricians; Plumbers; Machinists; Welders and Cutters; and Truck Drivers.
28Ideally, one would also want to estimate σν separately by occupation, rather than simply taking the estimate for
all high school graduates. Unfortunately,the PSID does not contain a large enough number of observations to do that.
However,Campbelletal.(2001)splithouseholdsinto36differentindustry-educationcells,andestimateseparatelabor
incomeproﬁles foreach cell. Thefourindustries that are most relevantfor ouroccupations(whichcoincidentallyhave
the largest cell sizes in the PSID), are the following (with Campbell et al.’s estimate of the permanent shock standard
deviation for high school graduates in the industry in brackets): Manufacturing (0.068), Construction (0.120), Trade
(0.106) and Transportation (0.067). The differences in the magnitude of the permanent shocks is in accordance with
what we ﬁnd on the occupation level: occupations that are mainly active in construction or trade tend to have a higher
standard deviation of earnings changes than the ones in manufacturing and transportation.
23they are young (on average, 50% of their annual income between ages 20 and 30)29 and only start
making substantial investments in the stock market after age 35. The predicted equity market
participation rate starts out around 20% for young households and increases through mid age,
reaching 95% at age 45. Average equity holdings at retirement amount to about three times annual
income; this is about twice as high as in the data. However, this is arguably not a major failing
of the model, as the model does not feature home equity, which in reality is a risky asset held
by most households. Other features of the model are that it predicts practically no borrowing
for households older than 40 years, and no signiﬁcant bond holdings at any age. Both of these
predictions are somewhat at odds with reality; this may be due to liquiditymotivesthat are missing
from the model.30 (In section 3.4.4, we will consider a version of our model in which households
are forced to invest at least 50% of their ﬁnancial wealth in bonds.) Another possible shortcoming
of the model is that it produces the consumption hump that is typically observed in empirical data
only for median consumption, while mean consumption increases until retirement.31
For our benchmark case, CE consumption equals 19,638 USD.32 The partial insurance coefﬁ-
cient averages 0.09 over the life cycle. This is signiﬁcantly lower than what Kaplan and Violante
(forthcoming) ﬁnd in their model, which features more redistributive social security, and is even
further below the baseline insurance coefﬁcients that Blundell et al. (2008) estimate in empiri-
cal data. This means that we may be overestimating the welfare cost of income uncertainty and
therefore also the potential gain that new assets would be able to provide. On the other hand, the
main insurance coefﬁcients reported by Blundell et al. and used as a benchmark by Kaplan and
Violante may give too optimistic a view of “true” insurance, as these coefﬁcients are computed
only from nondurable consumption. However, households may respond to income shocks largely
by changing their expenditures on durables, which then affects the utility ﬂows they get from these
29This is somewhat higher than the average unsecured borrowing (credit card balances plus installment loans and
other unsecured borrowing) as a percentage of income reported in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which
was 28% for below-30-year olds in 1995 and 1998 (Davis et al. 2006). However, Zinman (2009) ﬁnds that the SCF
misses around one-half of revolving debt.
30The continued credit card borrowing might also be due to consumers having self-control problems, as in Laibson
et al. (2007).
31Mean consumption is so much higher than median consumption in our model because some of our households
get very rich thanks to positive income and asset return shocks. It may be that the introductionof ﬂexible labor supply
would reduce this disparity.
32All dollar amounts are expressed in 1992 dollars.
24goods.33
The welfare cost to households imposed by income shocks is fairly high in our model: if
there were no life-cycle income shocks, but all asset return characteristics remained the same, CE
consumption would equal 22,861 USD, or 16.4% more.34 Thus, the ex-ante cost of income shocks
is high, and of a similar order of magnitude as what is found in the quantitative macro literature
discussed earlier. Thus, one would hope that introducing ﬁnancial assets for households to hedge
the risk of these income shocks could yield high welfare gains.35
3.4.2. Income-Hedging Instrument
Our baseline assumption for the mean return on the IHI available to a household is that it is
equal to the rate on risk-free bonds, or “actuarially fair”: E(˜ rIHI) = rl. We vary the correlation
of the return with the household’s permanent income shock from –0.25 to –1, taking –0.5 as our
baseline, using the empirical evidence discussed in section 3.3.2 as a guide. The baseline for
the standard deviation of returns is 0.5, meaning that the return on the IHI is much more volatile
than the return on equity. This may seem excessive, but given that the IHI is more useful to the
household if its return is more volatile (at least up to some point), and as in principle this asset
could be created to be arbitrarily volatile, we chose this high volatility as our benchmark.36
Table 3 summarizes the results, while ﬁgure 4 shows the mean life-cycle holdings of the IHI,
equity, and unsecured borrowing (denoted by “CC”, which stands for “credit cards”) for the base-
line case and also for two cases with higher (absolute) correlation.37
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding isthat householdswouldnot havehighdemand forthebaselineIHI. As thetop
left panel of ﬁgure 4 shows, mean holdings of the IHI never go much above 5,000 USD, and as the
top right and lower left panels show, this investment is ﬁnanced almost exclusively by a reduction
in equity holdings, not by additional borrowing. As a consequence, young households hold only
33Blundell et al. present some evidence that is consistent with this idea. As part of their sensitivity analyses, they
considera measure of total expenditureand ﬁnd that, at least for low-wealth households,there appears to be muchless
(indeed, no) insurance against permanent shocks in this case than when only nondurable consumption is considered.
34In this counterfactual,we do not alter the income shocks in the ﬁrst period of the working life, which can be seen
as a “ﬁxed effect,” for instance due to inherent differences in ability, and could never be insured against in our model.
35Meanwhile, the welfare gain of having access to stocks is fairly modest in this model: without equity, CE con-
sumption equals 19,424 USD, and thus only 1.1% less than in the benchmark with equity.
36The volatile version of our IHI also approximates a classical insurance contract, which pays off at all only in a
small number of states of the world.
37We do not display the case with lower correlation (ρ = −0.25) because in this case there are no IHI holdings.
25very little of the IHI (less than half the households hold any of this asset until age 33). Mean IHI
holdings peak around age 50, then slowly decline as households move towards retirement, while
equity holdings keep increasing until retirement.
The bottom right panel of the ﬁgure shows how the presence of the IHI affects the degree of
partial insurance against permanent income shocks. Particularly for young households, which are
not insured against shocks to permanent income, the degree of insurance is virtually unchanged
by the availability of the baseline IHI.38 Even for older households, the increase in the degree of
insurance is rather small.
Next, theﬁgure showshowstronglythedemand forthe IHI, as well as theimpacton borrowing
and equity holdings, depend on the correlation between the IHI return and the permanent income
shock. With ρ = −0.75, demand for the IHI is higher, but still starts out relatively low for younger
households. It is ﬁnanced by a combination of reduced equity holdings and additional borrowing.
On the other hand, with ρ = −1, households start holding high amounts of the IHI much earlier in
the life cycle, and borrow massively higher amounts — much more than what is needed to ﬁnance
theirIHI holdings. This is because there is nowless need for precautionary wealth, and households
can consume more in anticipation of higher future income. As the bottom right panel shows, in
this case insurance against the permanent income shock is much improved, even though it is still
only around 0.5 on average over the working life.
IHI return volatility matters greatly for mean holdings of the IHI as well as the effect on equity
holdings and borrowing.39 For the baseline correlation of –0.5, for example, there are practically
no IHI holdings when the standard deviation of IHI returns is only 0.3 (nobody invests in the
IHI until age 50; the maximum participation rate is 5%, right before retirement), and mean IHI
holdings also decrease for the other assumed correlations. Also, while with perfect correlation
and volatility 0.5, households’ average borrowing over the life cycle is above 25,000 USD, with
volatility 0.3 the corresponding number is below 4,000 USD. The partial insurance coefﬁcients are
also very signiﬁcantly reduced compared to the case with more volatile IHI returns.
38It may be surprising that the insurance coefﬁcient is slightly negative for young households in the benchmark.
Kaplan and Violante (forthcoming) explain that this is due to the interaction of permanent and transitory shocks in
this model (see their footnote 30).
39This can be seen by comparing lines 5–7 of table 3 to lines 1–3.
26Figure 5 displays the welfare gains over the benchmark case (in percent of CE consumption)
that having access to the IHI would generate for consumers. The ﬁrst thing one notes is how
strongly the gains depend on the correlation between the IHI return and the permanent shock, as
well as the volatility of the IHI return. Welfare gains are convex in the strength of the correlation.40
The welfare gains are tiny (below 0.1%) if the correlation is 0.5 or less, while if the correlation is
perfect and volatility high, the gain reaches almost 2.4% (with low volatility, on the other hand,
the corresponding gain is only 0.3%).
Overall, the results in this section indicate that unless the IHI had volatile returns that are
highly correlated with a household’s permanent income shock, the welfare gains it generates are
very small. As in the two-period model in section 2, the reason behind this surprising ﬁnding
lies in households’ effective cost of funds — the borrowing costs for young households and the
opportunity costs due to the possibility of investing in equity for older households.
3.4.3. Income-Linked Loans
For the ILL, our baseline assumption is that the mean interest rate a borrower needs to pay
on it is the same as for other unsecured (“credit card”) borrowing: E(˜ rILL) = rb. As in the
previous section, we again make different assumptions about the volatility of the interest rate and
its correlation with the household’s permanent income shocks. Our baseline assumption is to set
both parameters equal to 0.5.
Figure 6 shows mean borrowing through the ILL, equity holdings, and other borrowing un-
der this baseline assumption as well as for higher correlations. The ﬁrst panel shows that mean
ILL borrowing increases by age for young households, then peaks between ages 30 and 35, and
decreases towards retirement. The higher the correlation between the rate on the ILL and the
permanent income shock, the more extensively households borrow through the ILL.
It is interesting to consider the effect that the presence of the ILL has on other borrowing. The
bottom left panel shows that when ρ = 0.5, ILL borrowing reduces other borrowing early in the
life cycle, as one would expect, given that the ILL clearly has a lower risk-adjusted cost. What
may be more surprising at ﬁrst is that as ρ increases, householdsmassivelyincrease their ﬁxed-rate
borrowing, even though they also engage in a lot of borrowing through the ILL. This is because the
40They are also convex in the square of the correlation.
27uncertainty about future resources is now much smaller, so that young households want to borrow
to consume from their future (higher) income. What they do not consume is invested in equity,
so that mean equity holdings are higher for young households when ILL borrowing is available,
while equity holdings are lower for households that are approaching retirement, as they had less
need to accumulate precautionary wealth.
The bottomrightpanel displaystheinsurancecoefﬁcients, and we seethat especially for young
households, the ILL is much better at improving insurance than the IHI discussed in the previous
subsection. With ρ = 1, households approach perfect insurance, especially in the early parts of the
life cycle.
Lines 12–15 in table 3 show what happens to mean asset holdings (and welfare gains) if the
ILL interest rate is less volatile (0.3 instead of 0.5). It is interesting to note that the effect of
lowering volatility on mean ILL borrowing does not go in the same direction for all assumed
correlations. For some ρ, mean ILL borrowing increases when the ILL return volatility decreases
(because households needs to borrow more through the ILL to get the same degree of insurance)
while at other times mean ILL borrowing decreases (because the ILL is less attractive when its
volatility is lower). The effects on equity holdings are small, while other borrowing is reduced.
The welfare gains from different types of ILL are shown in ﬁgure 7. As was the case for
the IHI, these are again convex in the strength of the correlation of rates and permanent income
shocks. However, the gains are now much higher, and also less dependent on highly volatile rates.
For the baseline case of a correlation of 0.5, the welfare gain from ILL is 1.36% if volatility is 0.5
and 0.95% if volatility is 0.3. This would be quite a substantial welfare gain.
3.4.4. Alternative Calibrations
In this subsection, we investigate further what is driving the differences in welfare gains be-
tween the two income-linked assets we consider, and how sensitive our results are to the assumed
risk aversion of agents. A summary of the results is provided in table 4.
Equity returns and borrowing rates. One shortcoming of our benchmark model is that it does not
match empirically observed bond holdings — indeed, it predicts practically no bond holdings at
all, becauseequity isso much moreattractive. Thisis acommonfeature ofportfoliochoicemodels
28such as the one we use.41 One possible explanation for the lack of demand for bonds is that our
model ignores potential liquidity beneﬁts to holding the risk-free asset, or that participation costs
exist in equity markets that we have not modeled. In our model, the presence of equity makes
the IHI relatively less attractive (because it has to “compete” with equity to enter households’
portfolio) while the ILL is made relatively more attractive (because what a household borrows
through an ILL in order to insure against income ﬂuctuations can be invested in a high return
asset). As a consequence, our model may be understating the gains from the IHI and overstating
the gains from the ILL.
To address this issue, we solve a version of the model in which households are required to
invest at least as much money in bonds as they invest in equity, which will make the portfolios
generated by our model look more like what is observed empirically. For our calibration, this
assumption is equivalent to replacing equity by a 50/50 stock-bond fund with expected return
of 0.5   (E(˜ re) + rl) and standard deviation 0.5   σe. We again choose β such as to match the
mean wealth-to-income ratio before retirement, which yields β = 0.947. As compared with the
benchmark with no income-linked assets, the gain in CE consumption from having access to the
baseline IHI with correlation –0.5 and volatility 0.5 is now 0.33% and thus, as expected, higher
than if no bond holdings are required. In a related exercise that is more favorable to the IHI,
we assume that households could invest in 50/50 stock-bond funds and in 50/50 stock-IHI funds
(which assumes that households would view the IHI as a direct substitute for bonds in terms of
liquidity advantages). The predicted welfare gain from having access to such a vehicle would be
0.71%. Meanwhile, the baseline ILL now produces a welfare gain of only 0.85%, instead of the
1.36% without required bond holdings. Thus, even though the ILL is still more attractive than
the IHI, the differential welfare gain is now signiﬁcantly smaller than when no bond holdings are
required.
Next, weconsiderwhatwouldhappeniftheinterestratewedgebetweenborrowingandlending
were smaller, and solve a model with rb = 0.05. This may be applicable if households have access
to funding that is cheaper than credit card borrowing—for instance, through home equity loans.
41Some papers in the literature generate positive bond holdings, particularly later in the life cycle, by assuming a
muchhigherrisk aversionthanwe do. However,this leads themto predicttoo muchwealthaccumulationas compared
with U.S. data.
29As borrowing becomes cheaper, the gains from both income-linked assets increase: the baseline
IHI now produces a welfare gain of 0.8% while for the baseline ILL with E(˜ rILL) = 0.05 the gain
is a very substantial 3.04%. If the mean rate on the ILL is instead assumed to equal 0.08 as before,
while rb = 0.05, the ILL produces a welfare gain of 0.52%. Thus, the size of the borrowing wedge
is an important determinant of the absolute size of the predicted welfare gain, and if the mean rate
on the ILL is much above the rate on other borrowing possibilities the household has access to, the
usefulness of the ILL is reduced. In this example, in fact, the IHI now generates a higher welfare
gain than the ILL. However, we think that this case is less realistic than our benchmark case where
rb = E(˜ rILL) = 0.08, because in reality most household borrowing other than through mortgages
occurs at a rate signiﬁcantly above the return on risk-free saving.
Preferences. We additionally quantify the sensitivity of our results to the assumed coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion. Our baseline assumption is that this coefﬁcient equals 2, which seems rea-
sonable from micro studies of consumption behavior, and also corresponds to the most commonly
made assumption in macro models. However, the ﬁnance literature often assumes a much higher
risk aversion, in order to justify the observed equity premium. It is important to point out here
that in life-cycle portfolio choice models such as the one used in this paper, equity holdings usu-
ally increase in risk aversion over the range of risk aversion parameters that are at least somewhat
plausible (say, from 2 to 8). This is because more risk averse individuals accumulate more pre-
cautionary wealth to self-insure against their labor income ﬂuctuations, and this more than offsets
their lower willingness to invest in risky assets at any given wealth level. Hence, if we want to
match the empirically observed wealth-to-income ratio (or the observed debt holdings; see Davis
et al. 2006), we need to lower the discount factor when increasing the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion.
Here, we check what happens if we increase the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion γ from 2
to 3. For the benchmark case without income-linked assets, we need to lower the discount factor
β to 0.920 in order to match our target wealth-to-income ratio before retirement. In this case, the
welfare gain from our baseline IHI (with correlation –0.5 and volatility 0.5) is now 0.42%, which
is signiﬁcantly larger than the 0.04% in the case of γ = 2, but still rather small. For the ILL, the
effects are again more dramatic. The baseline ILL now produces a welfare gain of 2.42%, which
30is deﬁnitely very substantial for the standards of such models. Nevertheless, the gains from the
income-linked assets are still far below the welfare cost of labor income risk, which is 27.4% of
certainty-equivalent consumption if γ = 3.
4. Discussion
In our view, the most important results from the previous section can be summarized as fol-
lows: First, the potential use and usefulness of both income-linked assets strongly depends on the
characteristics of the assumed return process. For both assets, welfare gains are convex in the
assumed correlation between rates and permanent income shocks. Furthermore, the welfare gains
from the income-hedging instrument are very sensitive to the assumed volatility of the return,
while the same is the case in less extreme form for income-linked loans.
Second, income-linked loans usually generate higher welfare gains than the income-hedging
instrument. The extent of the difference is sensitive to the assumptions about other assets the
households can invest in. If an asset with high expected return (such as equity) is available, the
welfaregainsfromincome-linkedloansbecomerelativelylargerwhilethosefrom income-hedging
instruments become smaller.
Third, under some assumptions, namely a low borrowing wedge (a rate on borrowing that is
not much higher than the risk-free lending rate) or high risk aversion, the income-linked assets can
generate very substantial welfare gains, in excess of 2% of certainty-equivalent consumption.
Our fourth and ﬁnal main ﬁnding is that none of the assets we consider generate a welfare gain
that comes close to the 16.4 percent of certainty-equivalent consumption that would be attained
under our baseline parameter assumptions if life-cycle income risk were completely eliminated.
To understand these results, we reemphasize the intuition from the earlier two-period model:
in a world where borrowing rates are higher than returns on saving, risk management is expensive,
especially if a relatively poor household has to pay money upfront to insure against a future con-
tingency (this is the case for the income-hedging instrument, but not income-linked loans). It may
then not be worth it to do so, especially if insurance is imperfect. And even if one does not need
to borrow, putting money in a risk management asset may be inferior to just investing it in other
risky assets, such as equity.
Households would not eliminate all income risk even if the correlation between the returns on
31the income-linked asset and income shocks were perfect. This might seem surprising in light of
our assumption that the assets are fairly priced. However, in our constrained life-cycle framework,
actuarial fairness must be considered relative to the household’s cost of funds. Suppose that there
is an income-hedging instrument perfectly correlated with an investor’s labor income, and with an
expected return equal to the riskless rate. If the investor could borrow at the riskless rate, then he
would perfectly hedge away his income risk, at no cost. But if the investor needs to use a credit
card and pays a much higher interest rate, then the insurance requires a costly investment and is
no longer actuarially fair to this investor. To be sure, the investor would prefer the income hedging
instrument to the riskless asset, but an investor that is borrowing on a credit card should not invest
in the riskless asset anyway.
A frequently heard comment is that if people were as concerned with labor income risk as in
our model, and as rational and sophisticated as we assume them to be, they would hedge their
income risk by shorting an equity index of the industry they work in, or even the their employer’s
stock. There are different reasons for why such a strategy is not as appealing as one might think.
First, it is costly to take short positions, as one needs to post money in a margin account, and this
has an opportunity cost to the investor (in particular if he needs to borrow). Second, and perhaps
more surprisingly, the data on the correlation between industry stock returns and labor income
shocks to workers in this same industry reveal that the correlation is often near zero and unstable
over time (Davis et al. 2010). Thus, even ignoring the costs of taking short positions, such a
strategy might not provide a good hedge against labor income shocks.42
Another important issue is how the proposed income-linked instruments relate to currently
existing social insurance mechanisms such as unemployment and disability insurance, or the pos-
sibilityofdeclaringbankruptcytoclearone’sdebtafteranegativeshock. Giventhesemechanisms,
are income-linked assets even needed? One answer is that the existing institutions provide insur-
ance only temporarily (in the case of unemploymentinsurance) or against extreme negativeshocks
(disability insurance). Likewise, bankruptcy is very costly for defaulting households (in terms of
42The correlation between income shocks and stock returns may be more robustly positive at the ﬁrm level (it
certainly is for most executives), but shorting the stock of one’s own company may be undesirable for other reasons,
such as the possibility of being accused of insider trading. Also, a signiﬁcant fraction of the workforce does not work
for publicly traded companies.
32legal costs as well as limited access to credit in the future) such that the option to default on one’s
debt after an adverse income shock usually will only be exercised after an extreme negative in-
come shock, and thus may provide only a moderate ex-ante welfare gain. Income-linked assets,
on the other hand, would facilitate insurance against less extreme shocks, potentially at a low cost.
In evaluating income-linked assets, using a model with realistic borrowing and investment
opportunities for the households is crucial. If one instead relied on a simpler model in which there
isonlyoneotherasset, whichhouseholdscangolongorshortin, andstillassumedthattheincome-
linked assets were priced fairly, one would get very different results. In particular, there would
be no difference between income-linked loans and income-hedging instruments, return volatility
would not matter, and such a model would predict large welfare gains. For instance, if households
could borrow and save at 2%, and the mean return on the income-linked asset were also 2% and
had a correlation of 0.5 with permanent income shocks, the predicted welfare gains would exceed
4%.
5. Conclusion
Income-linked assets such as the ones we consider in this paper have the potential to be useful
for households’ income risk management, but as we have emphasized, the devil is in the details.
Folding the insurance against negative income shocks into a loan product makes it more useful to
households than letting them purchase the insurance directly.43 Furthermore, the correlation of the
income-linked assets with households’ permanent income shocks is a crucial determinant of the
predicted size of the welfare gains.
This latter point highlights the importance of measurement issues, a point made also by Shiller
(2003). To make good use of ﬁnancial instruments such as the ones we have considered, one
must be able to precisely measure both the risks households face and the covariance of those risks
with other risky ﬁnancial assets. This remains a challenge, and arguably it is this problem that
has prevented ﬁnancial intermediaries from offering income-linked assets. Measuring the interest-
rate risk exposure of a portfolio of ﬁnancial assets is much easier than measuring the exposure of
43Incidentally, we believe that the intuition from our model likely carries over to insurance against house price risk:
the welfare gains fromfoldingsuch insurancedirectly into mortgagecontracts (for instance, by reducingthe mortgage
principal if a — preferably local — house price index decreases) may be much larger than what households gain from
having access to a housing derivatives market in which they can purchase such insurance separately.
33individual household income. But the dramatic improvements in computing power and the wide
availability of large disaggregated datasets mean that these challenges can be overcome.
Our model focuses on the risk management beneﬁts that income-linked assets would provide,
taking the riskiness of household income as given. Shiller (2003) discusses some additional bene-
ﬁts that these instruments might have which are not part of our analysis. First, the prices of these
instruments (for instance, the borrowing rates on income-linked loans that the market offers to dif-
ferent professions) might aggregate and reveal information which would facilitate more effective
decision making—for instance, when choosing which occupation to enter. Second, the availability
of such instruments might encourage occupational choices that may be beneﬁcial for society but
(in the absence of insurance) perceived as too risky by an individual (such as highly specialized
areas of science which may be hit or miss). Analyzing the potential beneﬁts from these channels
could be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Welfare Gains from the Income-Linked Assets
ւILL
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Notes: “Cash-on-hand” refers to the sum of wealth and income available to the investor in period 1. Income in period
2 can take the values {5.4,8,10.6} with respective probabilities {1/6,2/3,1/6}.
37Figure 2: Income Process: Mean Proﬁle and One Realization
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Notes: Based on income proﬁles for high school graduates estimated by Cocco et al. (2005).
Figure 3: Life-Cycle Proﬁles in Benchmark Model




































































38Figure 4: Income-HedgingInstrument: Asset Holdings and Insurance Coefﬁcients for Different Correlations
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Notes: ρ denotes the correlation of the rate of return on the IHI with the permanent shock to labor income. All other
parameters are as in the “Baseline” column of table 2. “Benchmark” refers to the case without IHI.
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Notes: “Correlation” stands for the correlation of the rate of return on the IHI with the permanent shock to labor
income, and σ denotes the volatility of the rate of return on the IHI.
40Figure 6: Income-Linked Loans: Asset Holdings and Insurance Coefﬁcients for Different Correlations
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Notes: ρ denotes the correlation of the interest rate on the ILL with the permanent shock to labor income. All other
parameters are as in the “Baseline” column of table 2. “Benchmark” refers to the case without ILL.
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Notes: “Correlation” stands for the correlation of the interest rate on the ILL with the permanent shock to labor
income, and σ denotes the volatility of the interest rate on the ILL.
42Table 1: Welfare Gains (over Benchmark) in Two-Period Model
Gains in certainty-equivalent consumption, in percent,
for an investor with cash-on-hand of...
0 5 10 15
1) IHI with ρ = −0.5, σ = 0.25 0.49 0.00 0.02 0.01
2) ILL with ρ = 0.5, σ = 0.25 2.23 0.49 0.03 0.00
3) IHI with ρ = −1, σ = 0.25 5.03 0.75 0.29 0.25
4) ILL with ρ = 1, σ = 0.25 8.52 1.87 0.47 0.12
5) IHI with ρ = −0.5, σ = 0.5 1.20 0.20 0.13 0.08
6) ILL with ρ = 0.5, σ = 0.5 2.23 0.69 0.15 0.04
7) IHI with ρ = −1, σ = 0.5 6.94 1.61 0.74 0.51
8) ILL with ρ = 1, σ = 0.5 9.21 2.52 0.91 0.40
No income risk 9.21 2.81 1.40 0.84
Notes: ρ denotes the correlation of the return on the income-linked
asset with income in period 2. σ is the standard deviation of this return.
Table 2: Parameter Values
Parameter Baseline Alternative values
Relative risk aversion γ 2 3
Discount factor β 0.936 0.92, 0.939, 0.947
Age of labor force entry 20
Age of retirement 65
Age of death 80
Std. dev. of permanent shock σν 0.10296
Std. dev. of transitory shock σε 0.27166
Replacement rate λ 0.682
Risk-free lending rate rl 0.02
Risk-free borowing rate rb 0.08 0.05
Mean equity return E(˜ re) 0.06 0.04
Std. dev. of equity returns σe 0.16 0.08
Mean return on income-hedging instrument E(˜ rIHI) 0.02
Std. dev. of IHI return σILL 0.5 0.3
Correlation(˜ rIHI, ˜ ν) -0.5 -0.25, -0.75, -1
Mean rate on income-linked loan E(˜ rILL) 0.08 0.05
Std. dev. of ILL rate σILL 0.5 0.3
Correlation(˜ rILL, ˜ ν) 0.5 0.25, 0.75, 1
43Table 3: Summary Table of Results
Parameters Welfare measures Asset positions (in thousands)
Description E(˜ rILA) ρILA,˜ ν σILA c Gain (%) φ
ν
IHI ILL Eq CC
Benchmark 19638 0.09 33.82 2.33
1) IHI 0.02 -0.50 0.50 19646 0.04 0.12 2.98 29.51 2.34
2) IHI with higher corr. 0.02 -0.75 0.50 19750 0.57 0.26 9.71 21.61 6.32
3) IHI with perfect corr. 0.02 -1.00 0.50 20102 2.36 0.51 19.22 13.81 25.28
4) IHI with lower corr. 0.02 -0.25 0.50 19638 0.00 0.09 0.00 34.00 2.34
5) IHI with lower volatility 0.02 -0.50 0.30 19638 0.00 0.09 0.01 33.99 2.34
6) ”, higher corr. 0.02 -0.75 0.30 19644 0.03 0.12 4.24 27.56 2.34
7) ”, perfect corr. 0.02 -1.00 0.30 19689 0.26 0.25 11.45 18.44 3.99
8) ILL 0.08 0.50 0.50 19905 1.36 0.17 9.68 33.20 1.86
9) ILL with higher corr. 0.08 0.75 0.50 20398 3.87 0.39 20.20 33.97 4.19
10) ILL with perfect corr. 0.08 1.00 0.50 21497 9.47 0.79 37.50 31.85 17.20
11) ILL with lower corr. 0.08 0.25 0.50 19697 0.30 0.09 2.00 32.92 1.35
12) ILL with lower volatility 0.08 0.50 0.30 19825 0.95 0.11 7.75 30.91 0.47
13) ”, higher corr. 0.08 0.75 0.30 20161 2.67 0.26 23.21 32.86 1.11
14) ”, perfect corr. 0.08 1.00 0.30 20996 6.91 0.59 51.52 33.14 6.77
15) ”, lower corr. 0.08 0.25 0.30 19687 0.25 0.09 2.43 32.77 0.62
Notes: “ILA” = income-linked asset, refers to the income-hedging instrument (IHI) for cases 1) to 7) and to the income-linked loan (ILL) for cases 8) to 15).
ρILA,˜ ν = Correlation(˜ rILA, ˜ ν). c is certainty-equivalent consumption as deﬁned in equation (4). Gains are assessed with respect to the benchmark case. φ
ν
is the
(unweighted) average of the insurance coefﬁcient against permanent shocks (deﬁned in equation (5)) over the working life. Asset positions are unweigthed means
over the entire life cycle, with “Eq” referring to equity holdings and “CC” referring to unsecured borrowing (“credit cards”). Parameters other than the ones for
income-linked assets are as in the “Baseline” column of table 2.
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4Table 4: Summary Table of Results from Alternative Calibrations
Preferences Assets Welfare measures
γ β Stocks/Bonds ILA E(˜ rILL) rb c Gain (%) φ
ν
2 0.947 50/50 - - 0.08 19515 - 0.08
2 0.947 50/50 IHI - 0.08 19579 0.33 0.17
2 0.947 50/50 IHI/Eq. - 0.08 19653 0.71 0.20
2 0.947 50/50 ILL 0.08 0.08 19681 0.85 0.12
2 0.939 free - - 0.05 20092 - 0.05
2 0.939 free IHI - 0.05 20254 0.80 0.13
2 0.939 free ILL 0.05 0.05 20703 3.04 0.23
2 0.939 free ILL 0.08 0.05 20196 0.52 0.12
3 0.920 free - - 0.08 18244 - 0.08
3 0.920 free IHI - 0.08 18320 0.42 0.16
3 0.920 free ILL 0.08 0.08 18686 2.42 0.18
Notes: In the “Stocks/Bonds” column, “free” refers to the case where no minimum investment in bonds is required,
while “50/50” refers to the case where the household most hold at least as much money in bonds as in stocks. In the
“ILA” (= income-linked asset) column, “IHI/Eq.” refers to the case where households have access to 50/50 stock-IHI
funds.
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